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On Borders and Biopolitics
racialized, classed, and patriarchal versions of heterosexuality; and
shifting strategies of immigration control under neoliberalism, had not
been addressed in the scholarship, and I felt that they needed to be. I
believe that new logics of control were being formed, and new kinds of
questions needed to be asked.
However, neoliberalism itself is not a singular project or program; rather,
neoliberal projects and programs have been assembled in various ways in
different places and moments, and are continually changing. So it's
important to not reify neoliberalism and its modes of subject production
and governance, which are certainly always changing. Instead, we need to
historicize and problematize specific instances, which I did, in terms of
immigration controls in the US at a specific moment.

The Limits of Empathy:
An Interview with Marianne
Noble
Conducted by Rebecca Lane and
Jeffrey Zamostny

dC: How does social theory
factor into your work? Can you
tell us about your history with
social theory?
MN: For my first book, I read a
lot of poststructuralist theory,
such as that of Lacan and
Derrida. Lately, I have been
reading
other
kinds
of
philosophy-Common
Sense
philosophy, phenomenology-as
well as psychology. All of these
should also be well-informed by
social theory.
Actually, I think that a lot of
psychoanalytic
work
would
benefit from more so~ial the?~.
Many
psychoanalyti~
cntlcs
derive their theory entlrely from
Freud and they don't look at
cultur~ at all, only to the family
situation a child lived through
that is now causing him as an
adult to behave in whatever way
he's behaving. But when I was
five years old, I asked my mother,
"Mom what do you do for a
living?" and she said, "I'm a
doctor." I said, "You can't be a
doctor: you're a woman; you
must be a nurse." This sho.ws that
if you just study the famIly, you
cannot understand psychology. I
was five; my mother was a doctor,
and yet I believed that w?men
could not be doctors. ObVIously
that message did not come from

Marianne Noble is Associate
Professor in the Departme~t of
Literature at AmerIcan
University . She won a Choice
Outstanding Book Awardfor her
study The Masochistic Pleasures
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published by the Princeton
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Sympathy and the Quest f?r
Genuine Human Contact 10
American Romanticism. She
spoke on "The Limits of Empathy
and the Promise of Sex in Walt
Whitman and Julia Ward Howe"
for the 2010 Spring Lectu.re
Series of the Committee on SOCIal
Theory.
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my family. Where did that idea come from at that tender age? Well, in the
storybooks that we were reading, like Richard Scarry, and on TV, all of the
representations of doctors were male.

dC: When historicizing your work, what do you do with the notion of
law? How do you understand law from a literary or cultural studies
perspective?

I use social theory to study the social origins of people's thinking. One of
the great things about literature is that it treats the development of
characters in a social context. Harriet Beecher Stowe is someone whom
I've published on recently, and she says her job as a novelist is to explore
the psychology of characters by fleshing out their circumstances fully, with
the whole community, the whole religious, historical, and cultural
situation. That's why I like literature. When I ask questions like- Why are
people masochists? What causes good people to do evil actions? Or what
causes an evil person to behave charitably?- literature gives answers'that I
find fuller than those that would be given in a legal or economic answer.

MN: I understand law as the body of rules that govern civil society.
Cultural studies engages with how people actually live. These are not
always the same thing. For example, the dominant legal text in antebellum
America was Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, written
around 1770. It's a compendium of common law in England that served as
the cornerstone of American law. One of the laws I have studied in
Blackstone is the law of coverture, according to which a woman is legally
"covered" by her husband. She is invisible to the law. All kinds of rules
come out of this idea, such as that a woman cannot make a will because
that would imply she has investments apart from those of her husband.
But an important question is: how does this law make people think? Do
women and men understand women as invisible? Does this affect, say,
their sex life or their behavior in public? For this question, we can use
literary or cultural studies.

dC: About the relationship between theory and history ... How do you use
theory in a way that doesn't obscure the very specific context of history?
MN: I'~ not sure I do. I've been called on the carpet for that. Some people
have SaId, "How can you call this literature masochistic when the term
hadn't been invented yet?" and "How can you apply twentieth-century
analyses of masochism to nineteenth-century literature?" Honestly, I'm
not sure I entirely understand the question. Just because Foucault says the
homosexual wasn't invented until the 1870s, does that mean we can't call
Whitman a homosexual? And, can't we use queer theory to discuss his
writing even ifhe explicitly disavowed being a homosexual?
I do realize .that theories can cause people to find what they are looking
for. They did that for me. I was deeply steeped in Lacan and I saw
glimmers of Lacan allover, and I spent a while trying to make them be
what I.thought Lacan said they were. It's the Procrustean bed of theory. In
an anCIent Greek myth, Procrustes was an evil person. He had an iron bed.
When people came to his house, he put them on the bed. If they were too
sI?all, he would stretch them until they fit the bed. And if they were too
bIg, he would chop off their limbs until they fit the bed. The Procrustean
bed of theory is that you stretch what you find to fit your theory, or chop
?ff parts that ~on't. work. We do this all the time. Theory can be an
mtellectual straIghtjacket, though a very empowering straightjacket. It
helps us see things, but it can distort our interpretations. You need to ask
yourself, "Am I. just distorting my evidence to fit my theory?" But on the
other hand, WIthout the theory, you might have remained at a more
superficial level of thinking. Theory can take you deeper, but you need to
be aw~re and skeptical of your insights. I guess the best way to avoid
obscunng the context of history is to historicize. Know your period. Try
not to make broad statements based upon a single text. Read more and
know more. Immerse yourself in your period in a holistic way.
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dC: Much of your current work focuses on empathy and what you call
genuine human contact, and you will soon be teaching a course entitled
"The Limits of Empathy and Contemporary American Fiction." What are,
then, the limits of empathy?
MN: Empathy is feeling what another feels . It is a neural, immediate, and
automatic response to another person. The limits are that you can think
that you understand the other person when you don't. When I was a child,
I remember standing on the playground and having other children tease
me. They were chanting and making fun of me. It was a very searing
experience. But suppose I now hear people subjected to racial or sexual
taunting. And suppose I think that I know what they are going t?r?ugh
because I was teased on the playground. That is an example of the hmIts of
empathy. Suppose I were to say, "You can get over it, buck up. I know
exactly what you're going through." In fact, I don't know what they're
going through. Their situation is different from mine. And the whole
history and culture that comes into calling someone a nigger or a queer are
very different from my being teased. I think that empathy is wond~rful.
Empathy is one of the most beautiful things about human nature. But If we
don't recognize other people's differences and their unique circumstan~es,
we really don't understand them. And then we don't help them. If I beheve
that my childhood taunting is the same as racial taunting, then I'm not
going to try to pass laws against hate speech. I might just say, "Come ~n,
toughen up. All children go through that." Empathy must be. coupled WIth
a recognition of difference and a lot of listening to the other m order to be
truly sympathetic.
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de: Since we're talking about your new work on empathy, how do you
see the relationship between this new work and what you have already
written?
MN: Masochism is a quest for contact. One masochist I read said, "If
you're being hit, you know that you are not alone." Masochists are seeking
concrete and tangible signs of another person's presence. Emily Dickinson
has a number of poems in which she cherishes scars. One poem says,
"Each scar I'll keep for him / Instead 111 say of gem." She is saying that
he-whoever he was-scarred her, but she is going to call her scars gems
because they are signs that he was there, proof that this guy came. The
lover was there and then he left, and now she is suffering from emptiness
and sadness. But she appreciates the sign that he was there. It is present,
and though he is absent, the pain is present. It is an abiding proof that
there was contact.
The new book is about other kinds of contact, ways that do not involve
pain and suffering. I am exploring sympathy as an alternative and less
violent, way of making contact.
'

de: When you look at genuine human contact, is it between characters,
or between character and author, or between character and reader?
What kind of contacts are you looking at?
MN: I'm focusing on how contact is represented between two characters. I
am interested in the question of author and reader too, and it feels like a
shame to not write about that. I have a problem as a scholar, which is that
my thinking is too lateral. I need to resist the temptation to add more
examples and instead think more penetratingly.

de: Is that why you incorporated science into your studies about
emotion?
MN: That is a good example of my thought being lateral, actually. But
havin? heard about the brain science of emotion, I didn't think I could
meamngfully t~ about sympathy without thinking about it, because it
seems to explam so much to me. I was supposed to be reading
phenomenology, but I kept picking up these books on neuroscience. I
always want to understand why people do what they do, and that is what
neuroscientists are looking at. They tell us that the brain dictates more
than we t~ink it does. I love? a book by Christopher Frith called Making
Up the Mmd: How Our Bram Creates Our Mental World. And others by
Marco lacoboni, and Antonio Damasio and some others. These books
explore various ways that the self is not in control of our thoughts. They
are shaped or even determined by chemicals and neural wiring. I'm pretty
persuaded that a lot of our thinking is made up by our brains. A wonderful
book called The Echo Maker by Richard Powers explores that. Our brains

Noble
are neurologically wired to interpret information and make decisions
about what we see, and our brains continually adjust the visual
information that we receive to make sense. For example, if we see a big car
and a small car, our brains tell us that one is farther away than the other,
even if one is really just smaller than the other. It makes these
adjustments, and it's very difficult, if not impossible, to overwrite some of
that neural scripting.
My first book was about discourse and how desire becomes encoded on the
body by discourse. I did not resolve this to my satisfaction in my book, but
I'm not sure anybody can resolve it. Maybe discourse analysis can tell us
how a woman might come to desire a strong, cruel man, but what creates
the spasm in her genitals? How do we go from the discourse that
constructs identity to a physical response?

de: Within the field of literature, is it common to refer to science and
focus on the body?
MN: It is becoming more common. For example, the most recent edition
of the Norton Anthology ofAmerican Literature includes Richard Powers,
who writes about cognitive neuroscience. He explores human motivation
and behavior from a neurophysiological perspective, as well as from the
perspective of other sciences. So judging from the Norton, clearly a lot of
people in the field think this is a good trend. I am teaching it and I'm
raising these questions. I know we're not in a post-racial society, but I
personally am interested in analyzing other aspects of identity in American
literature. Identity politics, racial politics, have been extremely important,
and I still study and teach them, but I think that the body and the
embodied nature of emotion is a great new field.

